1. The Opinion of Henry of Ghent

38. [Exposition of the Opinion] - About the first point [n.37] the statement [sc. of Henry] is of the following sort, that something’s being in another can be understood in two ways: by being in it ‘first’, that is, totally - the way wine is in a jug; or by being in it partially, and this in two ways: either such that a part is in another and is not anything of the other, as the foot of the bird is in the trap and is not anything of the trap (and for this reason the whole bird is said to be in the trap), or that a part of it is in another and is something of that other (and for this reason that of which it is a part is said to be in that other).a

a [Interpolation] just as if some monster, possessing two bodies and two heads, had only two feet, then one [body and head] would be said to be in the other [body and head] by that other’s foot, because the foot is a part of the other.

39. As to the proposition then [n.37], the statement [of Henry] is that the Father is not in the Son in the first way.

40. The proof given is threefold:

First, because everything whatever of that which is in another in the first way is equally first in it - just as if earth is first in the center, then any part whatever of earth, as far as concerns itself, is equally first in the center; therefore if the Father is first in the Son, everything whatever of the Father will be first in the Son, and so paternity will be as equally first in the Son as deity. And from this further: just as by deity the Son is God, so by paternity he will be Father, which is false

41. Second, because that in which something is first seems to surround it and penetrate and contain it; but that the same thing with respect to the same thing contains and is contained, surrounds and is surrounded, is unintelligible;     therefore etc     .

42. Therefore it is necessary that, just as in creatures something is said to be in another as a part and not first, so one person may be said to be in another as to something of itself; but not as to something of itself that is nothing of that in which it is, because that would be the personal relation of the in-being person, and that relation is not the reason whereby a person is in a person (as will be plain in the second article [nn.58-62], wherein I agree with Henry); therefore it is the essence which is in such way something of the inbeing person that it is something of that in which it is.

43. And the proof that it is by reason of this essence of the Son, which exists in the Father, that the Son is in the Father is that wherever the foundation of any relation is, there the relation founded on it is; therefore wherever the essence is on which filiation is founded, there filiation is.

44. A distinction, however, is made as to the person ‘which is in another’ and the person ‘which another is in’, because although the person ‘which is in another’ is placed in another not first but by something of itself, that is, by its essence [n.42], yet the person which it is in is what the other is in first, that is itself totally, because it is itself totally disposed in some way as the reason of that which is surrounding and containing deity, which, although it is not part of the in-being person, is yet something of the person.

45. [Rejection of the Opinion] - Against this opinion.

First: to be ‘in’, as everyone thinks, does not state something self-referred, because then the Father would be in himself; therefore it states the relation of a person to a person. Not the relation of origin, because that does not have the same idea in the extreme terms (while the persons are in each other uniformly, according to them [n.60]); therefore it states a common relation [n.6]. But a common relation in accord with the same idea of foundation is in the supposit that is referred and in the supposit that it is referred to, just as likeness requires the same idea of whiteness in the like thing that is referred and in the like thing it is referred to; therefore if that to which the in-being person is referred is first such as what that person is in itself, the consequence is that the in-being person will be related by this relation first through itself and not through something precisely of itself.a

a [Interpolation] this is plain in the example about a rivalry between a and b.

46. Secondly as follows: when something is said to be in another by a part, it is in it by a part in the same way as the part is in it ‘first’. An example: if a man is on the earth by his foot, just as the foot is located on the earth so the man is by a part located on the earth - but it is not the case that if the foot is there as by location, the man will be there as form in matter; so too if whiteness is in a man by a part, because it is in his face, then in the same way of being ‘in’ as to the category in which it is in the face first - to wit, as an accident in a subject - in that same way, I say, it is in the man by a part, because it is in him as in a subject. Therefore if the Son is in the Father because of the essence that is formally in the Father, the consequence is that the Son is in the Father formally as it were (although according to something of himself), which is not to be ‘in’ by way of circumincession [sc. one person being in another and conversely].

47. The response is made that the major premise [sc. when something is said to be in another by a part, it is in it by a part in the same way as the part is in it ‘first’] is true when speaking of that which is the proximate reason of something’s being ‘in’, but is not true of the remote reason; but the essence, as it is formally in the Father, is not the proximate reason of the Son’s being in the Father but the remote reason - the proximate reason, however, is that he falls under the property of the in-being person.

48. On the contrary. This response includes the proposed conclusion, because that is said to agree with the whole ‘first’ which does not agree with it according to any part of itself but according to what comes from all the parts of itself, in the case of creatures; therefore things are such here that, since - according to them [sc. Henry and his followers] - there is in the person only relation and essence, whatever belongs to a person not precisely by reason of one of these, but by reason of the essence together at the same time with the relation (and conversely), belongs to it first, because this states the person in its totality.

49. Further [i.e. thirdly], the property of a person, since it is incommunicable, does not belong formally to the essence (as: the essence does not beget nor is begotten, nor is it distinct or referred), and not the converse either (the property that belongs to the essence as it is communicable does not belong to the person, because this property is proper to the essence as essence is distinguished from person [I d.2 nn.389-390]), because essence is single in the three persons, but person in no way - neither first nor according to something of itself - is single in the three; therefore since this way of being ‘in’, by which the essence is in the Father as a quasi form (to wit, as that by which the Father is God), belongs in no way to the person, because it is proper to essence as essence is distinguished from person, therefore in no way will the Father be said by this to be in the Son, just as neither from the fact that ‘the Father is essence’ will the Father be the same as the Son.